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INTRODUCTION 
Evidentiary problems in inter-state litigation, particularly in relation to the 
attribution of certain unlawful conduct, are not peculiar to cyber operations.1  Well 
before the cyber age, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua v. 
United States judgment conceded that “the problem is . . . not . . . the legal process of 
imputing the act to a particular State . . . but the prior process of tracing material 
proof of the identity of the perpetrator.”2  As the United States declared in the views 
on information security that it submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General, then, the 
ambiguities of cyberspace “simply reflect the challenges . . . that already exists [sic] in 
many contexts.”3  It is undeniable, however, that these challenges are particularly 
evident in the cyber context, where identifying who is behind a cyber operation 
presents significant technical problems.4  As has been effectively observed, “the 
Internet is one big masquerade ball.  You can hide behind aliases, you can hide 
behind proxy servers, and you can surreptitiously enslave other computers . . . to do 
your dirty work.”5 
One needs only look at the three most famous cases of cyber attacks against 
States allegedly launched by other States to realize how thorny the problem of 
evidence in relation to cyber operations is.6  It has been claimed, in particular, that 
the Russian Federation was behind both the 2007 Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks against Estonia and the 2008 cyber attacks against Georgia.7  These 
 
 1.   TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE glossary 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL] (defining cyber operations as “the 
employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving objectives in or by the use of 
cyberspace”).  Cyber operations include cyber attacks and cyber exploitation.  Cyber attacks are those 
cyber operations, whether in offense or in defense, intended to alter, delete, corrupt, or deny access to 
computer data or software for the purposes of (a) propaganda or deception; (b) partly or totally disrupting 
the functioning of the targeted computer, computer system, or network with any related computer-
operated physical infrastructure; and/or (c) producing physical damage extrinsic to the computer, 
computer system, or network.  Cyber exploitation refers to those operations that access other computers, 
computer systems, or networks, without the authorization of their owners or exceeding the limits of the 
authorization in order to obtain information, but without affecting the functionality of the accessed system 
or amending/deleting the data resident therein.  For a discussion of these definitions, see MARCO ROSCINI, 
CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–18 (2014). 
 2.   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, para. 57 (June 27). 
 3.   U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, 18, U.N. Doc. A/66/152 (July 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications]. 
 4.   Cf. FIREEYE, DIGITAL BREAD CRUMBS:  SEVEN CLUES TO IDENTIFYING WHO’S BEHIND 
ADVANCED CYBER ATTACKS 4 (2014), available at https://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/digital-bread-
crumbs.pdf (describing the technical difficulty in pinning down the source of a cyber attack given that 
“[c]ybercriminals are experts at misdirection” even in the non-State actor context). 
 5.   JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE:  INSIDE THE NEW THREAT MATRIX OF DIGITAL 
ESPIONAGE, CRIME, AND WARFARE 32 (2011); see also Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications, supra note 3 (“The lack of timely, high-confidence attribution and the possibility of 
‘spoofing’ can create uncertainty and confusion for Governments, thus increasing the potential for crisis 
instability, misdirected responses and loss of escalation control during major cyberincidents.”). 
 6.   The three most famous cases of cyber attacks are the Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) 
attacks against Estonia in 2007, the cyber attacks against Georgia in 2008, and the Stuxnet attacks against 
Iran discovered in 2012. 
 7.   Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, THE GUARDIAN, May 
16, 2007, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia; Jon Swaine, Georgia:  Russia 
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allegations were based on the following facts.  In the Estonian case, the hackers 
claimed to be Russian, the tools to hack and deface were contained in Russian 
websites and chatrooms, and the attacks peaked on May 9 (the day Russia celebrates 
Victory in Europe Day in the Second World War).8  Furthermore, although the 
botnets included computers based in several countries, it seems that at least certain 
attacks originated from Russian IP addresses, including those of State institutions.9  
According to the Estonian Defense Minister, the attacks were “unusually well-
coordinated and required resources unavailable to common people.”10  The DDoS 
attacks also took place against the backdrop of the removal of a Russian war 
memorial from Tallinn’s city center.11  Finally, Russia did not cooperate with Estonia 
in tracking down those responsible, and the Russian Supreme Procurature rejected a 
request for bilateral investigation under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between 
the two countries.12 
The cyber attacks against Georgia started immediately before and continued 
throughout the armed conflict between the Caucasian State and the Russian 
Federation in August 2008.13  It seems that the Russian hacker community was 
involved in the cyber attacks and that coordination “took place mainly in the Russian 
language” and in Russian or Russian-related fora.14  As in the Estonian case, some 
commentators claimed that the level of coordination and preparation suggested 
governmental support for the cyber attacks.15  Finally, IP addresses belonging to 
 
‘Conducting Cyber War,’ THE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
europe/georgia/2539157/Georgia-Russia-conducting-cyber-war.html.  For a discussion of denial of service 
attacks, see ROSCINI, supra note 1, at 18.  “Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, of which ‘flood attacks’ are an 
example . . . do not normally penetrate into the system but aim to inundate the target with excessive calls, 
messages, enquiries, or requests in order to overload it and force its shut down.  Permanent DoS attacks 
are particularly serious attacks that damage the system and cause its replacement or reinstallation of 
hardware.  When the DoS attack is carried out by a large number of computers organized in botnets, it is 
referred to as a DDoS attack.”  Id. 
 8.   COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, 
LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 173 box 
3.4 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) [hereinafter U.S. ACQUISITION 
AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES]. 
 9.   Id. 
 10.   Id. (quoting Jaak Aaviksoo, Minister of Defense of Estonia, Strategic Impact of Cyber Attacks, 
Address before the Royal College of Defence Studies, available at www.irl.ee/en/articles/strategic-impact-
of-cyber-attacks. 
 11.   U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES. 
 12.   Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War:  Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International 
Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 208 (2009); see also Alexander Klimburg, Mobilising Cyber Power, 53 
SURVIVAL:  GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 41, 49–51 (2011) (describing Russia’s recent support for cyber 
criminals in combating internal and external threats). 
 13.   See John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?_r=0 (describing the cyberattacks as “dress 
rehearsal” before the shooting began in the Russo-Georgian War). 
 14.   ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONAL CYBER 
INCIDENTS:  LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 75 (2010), available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/ 
legalconsiderations.pdf. 
 15.   Id. 
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Russian state-operated companies were used to launch the DDoS attacks.16  Russia 
again denied any responsibility.17 
The third case of alleged inter-state cyber operation, and possibly the most 
famous of the three, is that of Stuxnet.  In 2012, an article published in The New York 
Times revealed that the United States, with Israel’s support, had been engaging in a 
cyber campaign against Iran, codenamed “Olympic Games,” to disrupt the Islamic 
Republic’s nuclear program.18  Stuxnet, in particular, was allegedly designed to affect 
the gas centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility.19  The Stuxnet incident 
was the first known use of malicious software designed to produce material damage 
by attacking the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system of a 
critical national infrastructure.20  Unlike other malware, the worm did not limit itself 
to self-replication, but also contained a weaponized payload designed to give 
instructions to other programs.21  The allegations against the United States and Israel 
were based on journalistic “interviews . . . with current and former American, 
European and Israeli officials” and other experts, whose names are not known.22  In a 
recent interview, the former U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor 
Edward Snowden also claimed that the NSA and Israel were behind Stuxnet.23  
Symantec’s researchers suggested that Stuxnet’s code included references to the 1979 
 
 16.   Id. 
 17.   Id. 
 18.   David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-
iran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
 19.   William J. Broad, John Markoff, & David E. Sanger, Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran 
Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet. 
html?pagewanted=all.  Stuxnet presumably infiltrated the Natanz system through laptops and USB 
drives—as, for security reasons, the system is not usually connected to the Internet—and had two 
components:  one designed to force a change in the centrifuges’ rotor speed, inducing excessive vibrations 
or distortions that would destroy the centrifuges, and one that recorded the normal operations of the plant 
and then sent them back to plant operators so to make it look as if everything were functioning normally.  
See generally HOLLY PORTEOUS, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, THE STUXNET WORM:  JUST ANOTHER 
COMPUTER ATTACK OR A GAME CHANGER? 1–2 (2010). 
 20.   Dominic Storey, Stuxnet–The  First Worm of Many for SCADA?, IT RESELLER (Dec. 2, 2010), 
http://www.itrportal.com/articles/2010/12/02/6262-stuxnet-the-first-worm-of-many-for; see also Thomas 
Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 35 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 5, 18–20 (2012) (describing Stuxnet’s unique 
and innovative features). 
 21.   Jeremy Richmond, Note, Evolving Battlefields:  Does Stuxnet Demonstrate a Need for 
Modifications to the Law of Armed Conflict?, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 842, 849–50 (2012).  Although the 
exact consequences of the incident are still the object of debate, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) reported that, in the period when Stuxnet was active, Iran stopped feeding uranium into a 
significant number of gas centrifuges at Natanz.  See William J. Broad, Report Suggests Problems with 
Iran’s Nuclear Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/middleeast/24 
nuke.html (describing Iran’s various problems with its nuclear reactors while Stuxnet was operational, as 
well as international opinion as to whether Stuxnet caused those problems).  It is still unclear, however, 
whether this was due to Stuxnet or to technical malfunctions inherent to the equipment used.  See Ivanka 
Barzashka, Are Cyber-Weapons Effective?  Assessing Stuxnet’s Impact on the Iranian Enrichment 
Programme, 158 RUSI J. 48, 52 (2013) (proposing alternative explanations, including faulty machine parts, 
for the drop in centrifuge numbers). 
 22.   Sanger, supra note 18. 
 23.   Edward Snowden Interview:  The NSA and Its Willing Helpers, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-whistleblower-edward-snowden-on-global-
spying-a-910006.html. 
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date of execution of a prominent Jewish Iranian businessman.24  Other circumstantial 
evidence includes the fact that the worm primarily hit Iran and was specifically 
targeted at the Natanz nuclear facility, as the worm would activate itself only when it 
found the Siemens software used in that facility,25 and the implication that the attack 
required resources normally unavailable to individual hackers, which is supported by 
evidence of the high sophistication of the attack, the use of several zero-day hacks, 
and the insider knowledge of the attacked system.26  Israeli and U.S. officials have 
neither denied nor confirmed involvement in the operation:  In response to a 
question about the attack on Iran, President Obama’s chief strategist for combating 
weapons of mass destruction, Gary Samore, sardonically pointed out, “I’m glad to 
hear they are having troubles with their centrifuge machines, and the U.S. and its 
allies are doing everything we can to make it more complicated.”27  According to The 
Daily Telegraph, a video that was played at a retirement party for  Israel Defense 
Forces (IDF) chief of general staff Gabi Ashkenazi included references to Stuxnet as 
one of Ashkenazi’s operational successes.28 
Apart from the above well-known cyber attacks, allegations of state 
involvement have also been made in relation to other cyber operations, including 
cyber exploitation activities.  The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2013 Report to 
Congress, for instance, claims that some of the 2012 cyber intrusions into U.S. 
government computers “appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese 
government and military,” although it is not entirely clear on what grounds.29  
According to the controversial Mandiant Report, “the sheer number of [hacking 
group] APT1 IP addresses concentrated in these Shanghai ranges, coupled with 
Simplified Chinese keyboard layout settings on APT1’s attack systems, betrays the 
true location and language of the operators.”30  The Report concludes that “APT1 is 
likely government-sponsored and one of the most persistent of China’s cyber threat 
actors.”31  According to the Chinese Defense Ministry, however, “the report lacked 
‘technical proof’” linking the IP addresses used by ATP1 to a military unit of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as the attacks employed hijacked addresses.32  In 
 
 24.   NICOLAS FALLIERE, LIAM O. MURCHU & ERIC CHIEN, SYMANTEC, W32.STUXNET DOSSIER, 
VERSION 1.4, at 18 (2011), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security 
_response/ whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf. 
 25.   See Barzashka, supra note 21, at 50 (explaining that “more than 60 per cent of all infected IP . . . 
addresses were in Iran, and almost 70 per cent of these had Siemens software installed”). 
 26.   See Rid, supra note 20, at 19 (explaining that “[t]he resources and investment that went into 
Stuxnet could only be mustered by a cyber superpower . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27.   Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 19. 
 28.   Christopher Williams, Israel Video Shows Stuxnet as One of Its Successes, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 15 
2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/8326387/Israel-video-shows-Stuxnet-
as-one-of-its-successes.html. 
 29.   U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:  MILITARY AND SECURITY 
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2013, at 36 (2013), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ 2013_china_report_final.pdf. 
 30.   MANDIANT, APT1:  EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 39 (2013) 
[hereinafter MANDIANT, APT1], available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report 
.pdf. 
 31.   Id. at 2. 
 32.   China Condemns Hacking Report by US Firm Mandiant, BBC (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21515259. 
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May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice eventually brought charges against five 
members of the PLA for hacking into the computers of six organizations in western 
Pennsylvania and elsewhere in the United States to steal trade secrets, without 
providing much supporting evidence (if any at all) of the involvement of the 
defendants.33 
In spite of the obvious crucial importance of evidentiary issues, works on inter-
state cyber operations, both above and below the level of use of force, have so far 
focused on whether such operations are consistent with primary norms of 
international law and on the remedies available to the victim State under the jus ad 
bellum and the law of state responsibility.  Thus, studies of these operations have 
almost entirely neglected a discussion of the evidence the victim State needs to 
produce to demonstrate, either before a judicial body or elsewhere, that an unlawful 
cyber operation has been conducted against it and that the attack is attributable to 
another State.34  The first edition of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare also does not discuss in depth evidentiary issues in the 
cyber context:  The only references to evidence are contained in Rules 7 and 8.35  The 
present article aims to fill this gap.  It will start with a brief account of the 
international law of evidence and will then discuss who has the burden of proof in 
relation to claims seeking remedies (including reparation) for damage caused by 
cyber operations.  It will then analyze the standard of proof required in the cyber 
context.  Finally, the possible methods of proof will be examined, distinguishing 
between those that are admissible and those that are inadmissible.  The present 
article only deals with international disputes between States and will not discuss 
evidentiary issues in relation to cyber crime before domestic courts.  It also does not 
look at evidence before international criminal tribunals, as the focus is on state 
responsibility for cyber operations and not on the criminal responsibility of 
individuals.36 
 
 33.   See Indictment at 29–35, United States v. Wang Dong, No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa., May 1, 2014), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf (laying out the facts and 
evidence related to the five defendants’ overt cyber attacks). 
 34.   See generally Robin Geiß & Henning Lahmann, Freedom and Security in Cyberspace:  Shifting the 
Focus away from Military Responses Towards Non-Forcible Countermeasures and Collective Threat-
Prevention, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE:  INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY 621 (Katharina Ziolkowski ed., 2013) [hereinafter 
PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE] (explaining the problems of attribution of 
responsibility for cyber attacks in the context of self-defense considerations); see also Scott J. Shackelford 
& Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks:  Competing Standards for a Growing 
Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 984–93 (2011) (positing standards of evidence and describing the 
problems with evidence and attribution of cyber attacks to different sovereigns).  In the context of law 
enforcement, the Council of Europe and European Union have drafted an Electronic Evidence Guide for 
cyber crime.  CYBERCRIME@IPA JOINT PROJECT OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, Electronic Evidence Guide:  A Basic Guide for Police Officers, Prosecutors, and Judges (Mar. 18, 
2013), available at, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Electron 
ic%20Evidence%20Guide/default_en.asp. 
 35.   TALLINN MANUAL r. 7–8. 
 36.   The statutes and rules of international criminal tribunals provide for specific evidentiary rules.  
Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence, in 5 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 552, 567–69 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). 
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I. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EVIDENCE 
“Evidence” is “information . . . with the view of establishing or disproving 
alleged facts.”37  It is different from proof in that “‘proof’ is the result or effect of 
evidence, while ‘evidence’ is the medium or means by which a fact is proved or 
disproved.”38  Evidence is normally required to provide proof of both the objective 
(be it an act or omission) and subjective elements of an internationally wrongful act, 
i.e., its attribution to a State.39  A State invoking self-defense against cyber attacks, 
for instance, will have to produce evidence that demonstrates (a) that the cyber 
attack actually occurred, that it was directed against the State, and that its scale and 
effects reached the threshold of an “armed attack”;40 and (b) that it was attributable 
to a certain State.41  For a State to invoke the right to take countermeasures, on the 
other hand, it may be sufficient to provide evidence that a cyber operation originated 
from a certain State and that that State did not exercise due diligence in terminating 
it, without necessarily having to prove attribution of the attack itself to the State.42  In 
the Nicaragua case, the ICJ clearly explained the distinction between the objective 
and subjective elements from an evidentiary perspective: 
One of the Court’s chief difficulties in the present case has been the 
determination of the facts relevant to the dispute. . . .  Sometimes there is 
no question, in the sense that it does not appear to be disputed, that an act 
was done, but there are conflicting reports, or a lack of evidence, as to who 
did it . . . .  The occurrence of the act itself may however have been 
shrouded in secrecy.  In the latter case, the Court has had to endeavour 
first to establish what actually happened, before entering on the next stage 
of considering whether the act (if proven) was imputable to the State to 
which it has been attributed.43 
The Court’s observations were made against the backdrop of the secrecy that 
surrounded the U.S. and Nicaraguan covert operations in Central America,44 which is 
also a quintessential characteristic of cyber operations.45  In this context too, then, it 
is likely that evidence will be required both to establish the material elements of the 
wrongful act and to establish its attribution.  It is still unclear, for instance, not only 
who is responsible for Stuxnet, but also whether the worm caused any damage and, if 
so, to what extent.46  This last question is essential in order to establish whether the 
 
 37.   Id. at 552. 
 38.   31A C.J.S. Evidence § 8 (1964). 
 39.   See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 57 (June 27) (noting the difficulty of imputing acts to particular States). 
 40.   Id. para. 195.  On the distinction between “use of force” and “armed attack,” see id. paras. 191, 
195. 
 41.   See generally ROSCINI, supra note 1, at 80–88 (discussing whether self-defense can be exercised 
against cyber attacks by non-state actors). 
 42.   Geiß & Lahmann, supra note 34, at 635–37. 
 43.   Nicar. v. U.S., Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. para. 57. 
 44.   Id. 
 45.   See ROSCINI, supra note 1, at 38. 
 46.   See Barzashka, supra note 21, at 48 (noting that no one has admitted to the Stuxnet attack and 
that the “evidence of the worm’s impact . . . is circumstantial and inconclusive”). 
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cyber operation amounted to a use of force and, more importantly, whether it was an 
armed attack entitling the victim State to self-defense.47  As to establishing the 
subjective element of the internationally wrongful act, what is peculiar to cyber 
operations is that in fact three levels of evidence are needed to attribute a cyber 
operation to a State:  First, the computer(s) or server(s) from which the operations 
originate must be located; second, the individual behind the operation needs to be 
identified; and third, it needs to be proved that the individual acted on behalf of a 
State so that his or her conduct is attributable to it.48 
This leads us to an important specification:  The standard of proof must be 
distinguished from the rules of attribution.  The former is “the quantum of evidence 
necessary to substantiate the factual claims made by the parties.”49  The latter, on the 
other hand, determine the level of connection that must exist between an individual 
or group of individuals and a State for the conduct of the individuals to be attributed 
to the State at the international level.50  The rules of attribution for the purposes of 
state responsibility have been codified in Part One of the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the 
International Law Commission (ILC), as well as having been articulated in the case 
law of the ICJ.51  Evidence according to the applicable standard must be provided to 
demonstrate that the attribution test has been satisfied:  In Nicaragua, for instance, 
the ICJ had to assess whether there was sufficient evidence that the United States 
had exercised “effective control” over the contras so that it could be held responsible 
for their violations of international humanitarian law.52 
The standard of proof should also be distinguished from the burden of proof.  
The latter does not determine how much evidence, and of what type, is necessary to 
prove the alleged facts, but merely identifies the litigant that must provide that 
evidence.53  In other words, the burden of proof is “the obligation on a party to show 
 
 47.   See ROSCINI, supra note 1, at 45–63, 70–77 (describing the meaning of “use of force” and when 
and how a State can use self-defense). 
 48.   See generally id. at 98–103. 
 49.   James A. Green, Fluctuating Evidentiary Standards for Self-Defence in the International Court of 
Justice, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 163, 165 (2009). 
 50.   For a discussion of the rules of attribution, see ROSCINI, supra note 1, at 34–40. 
 51.   Draft Articles on Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, pt. 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 (2001).  For case law development, see, e.g., Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 
2007 I.C.J. 43, paras. 392–93 (Feb. 26); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. V. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 110, 393 (June 27).  For further discussion, see generally 
ROSCINI, supra note 1, at 34–40. 
 52.   Nicar. v. U.S., Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. para. 115.  In the Nicaragua case the Court did not find that 
there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the contras were totally dependent on the United States so 
as to qualify as de facto organs.  However, it found that a situation of partial dependency, 
the exact extent of which the Court cannot establish, may certainly be inferred inter alia from 
the fact that the leaders were selected by the United States.  But it may also be inferred from 
other factors, some of which have been examined by the Court, such as the organization, 
training and equipping of the force, the planning of operations, the choosing of targets and the 
operational support provided. 
Id. para. 112. 
 53.   ANNA RIDDELL & BRENDAN PLANT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 81 (2009). 
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that they have sufficient evidence on an issue to raise it in a case.”54  The burden of 
proof includes not only the “burden of persuasion,”55 but also the “burden of 
production,” which is the burden to produce the relevant evidence before a court.56 
Evidence may be submitted not only to an international court or tribunal, but 
also to political organs (for instance, to secure a favorable vote).57  It may also be 
disseminated more widely for the purposes of influencing public opinion and gaining 
support for certain actions or inactions.58  One could recall the evidence presented by 
the Reagan Administration before the U.N. Security Council to justify its 1986 strike 
on Tripoli as a measure of self-defense.59  When justifying its 2001 armed operation 
against Afghanistan, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
referred to the fact that the U.S. government had “clear and compelling information 
that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, had a central role in the [September 11, 2001] attacks,” without, 
however, going into further details.60  The same language was used by the Secretary-
General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).61  Evidence was also 
famously one of the controversial aspects of the 2003 U.S. and U.K.-led intervention 
in Iraq.62  More recently, in the context of the proposed intervention to react against 
the use of chemical weapons in Syria, President Obama stated that “attack[ing] 
another country without a UN [sic] mandate and without clear evidence that can be 
 
 54.   Id. 
 55.   See id. (stating that the burden of proof is the “duty of a party to persuade”). 
 56.   Markus Benzing, Evidentiary Issues, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE:  A COMMENTARY 1234, 1245 (Andreas Zimmermann et al., eds., 2012) [hereinafter THE 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:  A COMMENTARY].  As there are no parties in 
advisory proceedings, there is no burden of proof in this type of proceeding.  Wolfrum, supra note 36, at 
565. 
 57.   See Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States that Might Have Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2009) (discussing the George W. Bush administration’s unilateral 
approach for decisions regarding self-defense based on evidence of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs)). 
 58.   Whether or not States have an obligation to make evidence public is a matter of debate.  It has 
been observed that “[i]f nations are permitted to launch unilateral attacks based on secret information 
gained largely by inference, processed by and known only to a few individuals and not subject to 
international review, then Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is rendered virtually meaningless.”  Jules 
Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks:  The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 
YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 547 (1999).  See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING 
HUMANITY:  WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY 169 (2008) (noting that “[t]he principle of publicity is 
critical” because “there is no authority but the eyes of the world to assess” whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support a State’s actions).  But see Waxman, supra note 57, at 65 (“One practical problem 
frequently raised in response is that key information often cannot be disclosed publicly without 
compromising critical intelligence sources and methods.”). 
 59.   Lobel, supra note 58, at 549. 
 60.   Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated 7 October 2001 from 
the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, UN Doc S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001). 
 61.   Lord George Robertson, Statement by NATO Secretary General (Oct. 2, 2001), available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm. 
 62.   See generally U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION:  THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT (2002) (summarizing evidence of the 
various weapons capabilities of the Iraqi government as of 2002); U.N. SCOR, 58th Year, 4701st mtg. at 2–
17, U.N. Doc S/PV.4701 (Feb. 5, 2003) (transcribing Colin Powell’s remarks to the Security Council 
regarding WMDs in Iraq). 
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presented” would raise questions of international law.63  The political or judicial 
relevance of evidence may relate to the different phases of the same international 
dispute.  For instance, the State invoking the right of self-defense against an armed 
attack by another State will normally try to justify the exercise of this right first 
before the international community and public opinion by providing evidence of the 
occurrence (or imminent occurrence) of the armed attack and of its attribution to the 
target State.64  If, as in the Nicaragua case, a State subsequently brings the case 
before an international court which has jurisdiction over the case, the evidence will 
have to be assessed by that court in order to establish international responsibility and 
its consequences, and in particular whether the requirements for the exercise of self-
defense were met.65 
Investigations of cyber attacks among States are complicated by the absence of 
a uniform body of rules on the production of evidence in international law.66  There is 
no treaty provision that regulates evidentiary issues in non-judicial contexts, and it is 
doubtful that international law has developed customary rules in that sense.67  As to 
the production of evidence in inter-state litigation, non-criminal international courts 
normally determine their own standards in each case, which may considerably differ 
according to the nature of the court or the case under examination.68  As it is not 
possible to identify uniform evidentiary rules applicable in all cases and before all 
international courts, this article will focus on proceedings before the ICJ.  This is 
because the ICJ is the main U.N. judicial organ that deals, if the involved States have 
consented to its jurisdiction, with claims of state responsibility arising from the 
violation of any primary norm of international law.69  The overall purpose is to 
establish whether rules on evidence may be identified that would apply to claims in 
inter-state judicial proceedings seeking remedies for damage caused by cyber 
 
 63.   Julian Borger, West Reviews Legal Options for Possible Syria Intervention Without UN Mandate, 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 26, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/26/united-nations-mandate-
airstrikes-syria.  Indeed, the Report of the U.N. Secretary-General’s Investigation found “clear and 
convincing evidence” of the use of chemical weapons in the armed conflict.  Rep. of the U.N. Mission to 
Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the Alleged Use 
of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, U.N. Doc. A/67/997–
S/2013/553, GAOR, 67th Sess., 8 (Sept. 16, 2013). 
 64.   See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 895 (2002) 
[hereinafter O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense] (“In many cases of self-defense, the facts of the attack and 
the responsible party are evident for all the world to see.  Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait is a case in point.  
When a less obvious event occurs, like the September 11 attacks, the [S]tate contemplating self-defense 
may have to provide evidence that future attacks are pending.”). 
 65.   See, e.g., Ruth Teitelbaum, Recent Fact-Finding Developments at the International Court of 
Justice, 6 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 119, 151 (2007) (describing the International Court of 
Justice’s (ICJ) assessment of the evidence in the Nicaragua case). 
 66.   Mary Ellen O’Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 19, 21 (2002) 
[hereinafter O’Connell, Evidence of Terror]. 
 67.   Id.; see also Green, supra note 49, at 165 (“In general, international law does not have a clear 
benchmark against which the persuasiveness or reliability of evidence may be gauged for the purposes of 
attributing responsibility or assessing legal claims.  In other words, there is no consistent standard of proof 
with regard to international obligations.”). 
 68.   See Daniel Joyce, Fact-Finding and Evidence at the International Court of Justice:  Systemic Crisis, 
Change or More of the Same?, 18 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 283, 286 (2007) (“The theme of flexibility 
dominates public international law’s approach to evidence.”). 
 69.   See, e.g., H. Vern Clemons, Comment, The Ethos of the International Court of Justice is 
Dependent Upon the Statutory Authority Attributed to its Rhetoric:  A Metadiscourse, 20 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1479, 1486, 1490–91 (1997) (detailing modes of jurisdiction by the ICJ over States). 
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operations.  It should be noted, however, that the conclusions reached with regard to 
the ICJ only apply to it and could not automatically be extended to other 
international courts. 
Rules on the production of evidence before the ICJ are contained in the ICJ 
Statute, the Rules of Court (adopted in 1978), and Practice Directions for use by 
States appearing before the Court (first adopted in 2001 and subsequently 
amended).70  In the following pages, the relevant rules on evidentiary issues 
contained in those documents, as well as those elaborated by the Court in its 
jurisprudence, will be applied to allegations related to cyber operations. 
II. BURDEN OF PROOF AND CYBER OPERATIONS 
The burden of proof identifies the litigant that has the onus of meeting the 
standard of proof by providing the necessary evidence.71  Once the burden has been 
discharged according to the appropriate standard, the burden shifts to the other 
litigant, who has to prove the contrary.72  Normally, the party that relies upon a 
certain fact is required to prove it (the principle onus probandi incumbit actori, 
derived from Roman law).73  This general principle of law, invoked consistently by 
the ICJ and other international courts and tribunals,74 “applies to the assertions of 
fact both by the Applicant and the Respondent.”75  The party bearing the burden of 
proof, therefore, is not necessarily the applicant (i.e., the State that has brought the 
application before the tribunal) but is rather the party “who . . . raised an issue,”76 
regardless of its procedural position.77  For instance, the party (applicant or 
respondent) that relies on an exception, including self-defense, has the burden of 
proving the facts that are the basis for the exception.78  It should also be recalled that 
the distinction between applicant and respondent may not always be clear in inter-
 
 70.   Rules of Court, arts. 38–89, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 6; Statute of the International Court of 
Justice arts. 39–64, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933; I.C.J. Practice Directions of the International Court of 
Justice, Practice Direction IX, 2007 Acts & Docs. 163. 
 71.   Green, supra note 49, at 165.  
 72.   See Roger B. Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1151, 
1159 (1972) (“No one seems to have trouble understanding that the burden of producing evidence on one 
issue may shift from party to party as the case progresses.”). 
 73.   Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, para. 162 (Apr. 20); see 
also NATHAN D. O’MALLEY, RULES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  AN ANNOTATED 
GUIDE 203 n.34 (2012) (explaining the Roman roots of the concept). 
 74.   Teitelbaum, supra note 65, at 121. 
 75.   Arg. v. Uru., 2010 I.C.J. para. 162. 
 76.   RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 53, at 89 (citing “an early indication that the Court w[ill] look 
carefully into which party [is] seeking to rely on certain facts, rather than relying on the traditional 
applicant/respondent dichotomy.”). 
 77.   According to Shabtai Rosenne, “the tendency of the Court is to separate the different issues 
arising in a case, treating each one separately, applying the rule actori incumbit probatio, requiring the 
party that advances a particular contention to establish it in fact and in law.  The result is that each State 
putting forward a claim is under the general duty to establish its case, without there being any implication 
that such State is ‘plaintiff’ or ‘applicant’ in the sense in which internal litigation uses those terms.”  
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920–2005, at 1200–01 
(4th ed. 2006), 
 78.   Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, para. 57 (Nov. 6); RIDDELL & PLANT, 
supra note 53, at 87. 
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state litigation, especially when the case is brought before an international court by 
special agreement between the parties.79 
The onus probandi incumbit actori principle is subject to three main limitations.  
First, facts that are not disputed or that are agreed upon by the parties do not need to 
be proven.80  Second, the Court has relieved a party from the burden of providing 
evidence of facts that are “notorious” or “of public knowledge.”81  In Nicaragua, for 
instance, the Court found that “since there was no secrecy about the holding of the 
manoeuvres [sic], the Court considers that it may treat the matter as one of public 
knowledge, and as such, sufficiently established.”82  As has been noted, “the notion of 
common or public knowledge has, over the years, expanded, given the wide 
availability of information on current events in the press and on the [I]nternet.”83  
Companies like McAfee, Symantec, Mandiant, and Project Grey Goose, as well as 
think tanks like NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD 
COE), have also published reports on cyber incidents.84  These reports essentially 
contain technical analysis of cyber incidents and, with the possible exception of those 
of the CCD COE, do not normally investigate attribution for legal purposes of those 
incidents in any depth (if at all).85  The fact that cyber incidents have received 
extensive press coverage, as in the case of Stuxnet, may also contribute to the public 
knowledge character of certain facts.  In Nicaragua, however, the ICJ warned that 
“[w]idespread reports of a fact may prove on closer examination to derive from a 
single source, and such reports, however numerous, will in such case have no greater 
value as evidence than the original source.”86  The ICJ has also held that the “massive 
body of information” available to the Court, including newspapers, radio and 
television reports, may be useful only when it is “wholly consistent and concordant as 
to the main facts and circumstances of the case.”87 
Third, the onus probandi incumbit actori principle only applies to facts, as 
opposed to the law, which does not need to be proven (jura novit curia).88  It should 
be noted, however, that, in inter-state litigation, municipal law is a fact that must be 
 
 79.   RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 53, at 89.; Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley, Evidence Before the 
International Court of Justice, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 533, 538 (Ronald St. John 
Macdonald ed., 1994). 
 80.   Wolfrum, supra note 36, at 563. 
 81.   See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 92 (June 27) (accepting a newspaper report as evidence of notoriety).  
Judicial notice has been frequently invoked by international criminal tribunals.  Teitelbaum, supra note 65, 
at 144–45. 
 82.   Nicar. v. U.S., Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. para. 92. 
 83.   RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 53, at 142–43. 
 84.   TIKK ET AL., supra note 14; MANDIANT, 2014 THREAT REPORT [hereinafter MANDIANT, 
THREAT REPORT], available at http://dl.mandiant.com/EE/library/WP_M-Trends2014_140409.pdf; 
MCAFEE, MCAFEE LABS THREATS REPORT (2014), available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/re 
ports/rp-quarterly-threat-q1-2014.pdf; SYMANTEC CORP., INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT (2014), 
available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-istr_main_report_v19_21 
291018.en-us.pdf. 
 85.   See generally TIKK ET AL., supra note 14; MANDIANT, THREAT REPORT, supra note 84; MCAFEE, 
supra note 84; SYMANTEC CORP., supra note 84. 
 86.   Nicar. v. U.S., Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. para. 63. 
 87.   United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 
para. 13 (May 24). 
 88.   Wolfrum, supra note 36, at 556. 
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proven by the parties invoking it.89  Furthermore, the ICJ has often distinguished 
between treaty law and customary international law, holding that the existence and 
scope of customary rules—especially those of a regional character—must be proven 
by the parties because one of their two elements, state practice, is factual.90  A party 
invoking national legislation or the existence of a general or cyber-specific custom in 
its favor, therefore, will bear the burden of producing relevant evidence before the 
Court.  Certain authors have suggested that shifting the burden of proof “from the 
investigator and accuser to the nation in which the attack software was launched” 
could solve the problems of identification and attribution in the cyber context.91  In 
such an approach, international law would require the State where the attack 
originated to prove that it neither carried out the operation nor negligently allowed 
others to misuse its infrastructure, as opposed to requiring the accuser to prove the 
contrary.  Similarly, it has been argued that “[t]he fact that a harmful cyber incident 
is conducted via the information infrastructure subject to a nation’s control is prima 
facie evidence that the nation knows of the use and is responsible for the cyber 
incident.”92  This, however, is not correct.  First, mere knowledge does not 
automatically entail direct attribution, but rather merely a potential violation of the 
due diligence duty not to allow hostile acts from one’s territory.93  What is more, the 
views arguing for a reversal of the burden of proof are at odds with the jurisprudence 
constante of the ICJ.94  In the Corfu Channel case, the Court famously found that the 
exclusive control exercised by a State over its territory “neither involves prima facie 
responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof” in relation to unlawful acts perpetrated 
therein.95  The Court, however, conceded that difficulties in discharging the burden of 
proof in such cases may allow “a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and 
circumstantial evidence.”96  This point will be further explored below in Part VI.97  In 
Armed Activities (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), the ICJ also did not shift the burden 
of proving that Zaire had been in a position to stop the armed groups’ actions 
originating from its border regions, as claimed by Uganda in its counter-claim, from 
Uganda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and therefore found that 
it could not “conclude that the absence of action by Zaire’s Government against the 
rebel groups in the border area is tantamount to ‘tolerating’ or ‘acquiescing’ in their 
activities.”98 
 
 89.   Id. at 557. 
 90.   Asylum Case (Colom. v. Perú), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276–77 (Nov. 20); Rights of Nationals 
of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), Judgment 1952 I.C.J. 176, 200 (Aug. 27). 
 91.   RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR:  THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 249 (2010). 
 92.   Daniel J. Ryan, Maeve Dion, Eneken Tikk & Julie J. C. H. Ryan, International Cyberlaw:  A 
Normative Approach, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1161, 1185 (2011). 
 93.   See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9) (“It cannot be concluded 
from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that that State 
necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein . . . .”). 
 94.   See id. (stating that control by a State over its borders does not shift the burden of proof to the 
accused State). 
 95.   Id. 
 96.   Id. 
 97.   See infra Part VI. 
 98.   Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 
I.C.J. 168, para. 301 (Dec. 19).  Judge Kooijmans wrote a separate opinion, arguing that “[i]t is for the 
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If one applies these findings in the cyber context, the fact that a State has 
exclusive “territorial” control of the cyber infrastructure from which the cyber 
operation originates does not per se shift the burden of proof, and it is therefore still 
up to the claimant to demonstrate that the territorial State is responsible for the 
cyber operation or that it failed to comply with its due diligence duty of vigilance, 
and not to the territorial State to demonstrate the contrary.99 
Even beyond the principle of territorial control, the fact that relevant evidence 
is in the hands of the other party does not per se shift the burden of proof.  In the 
Avena case, the ICJ held that it could not 
accept that, because such information may have been in part in the hands 
of Mexico, it was for Mexico to produce such information.  It was for the 
United States to seek such information, with sufficient specificity, and to 
demonstrate both that this was done and that the Mexican authorities 
declined or failed to respond to such specific requests. . . .  The Court 
accordingly concludes that the United States has not met its burden of 
proof in its attempt to show that persons of Mexican nationality were also 
United States nationals.100 
The fact that cyber operations were conducted in the context of an armed 
conflict, as was the case of those against Georgia in 2008,101 also does not affect the 
normal application of the burden of proof.102  In Nicaragua, the ICJ recalled the 
Corfu Channel and Tehran Hostages judgments and found that “[a] situation of 
armed conflict is not the only one in which evidence of fact may be difficult to come 
by, and the Court has in the past recognized and made allowance for this . . . .”103  
Even in such circumstances, therefore, “it is the litigant seeking to establish a fact 
 
State under a duty of vigilance to show what efforts it has made to fulfill that duty and what difficulties it 
has met” and concluding that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had not provided evidence to 
show that it had adopted “credible measures” to prevent transborder attacks.  Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 306, paras. 82–83 (Dec. 19) 
(separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans). 
 99.   It should not be forgotten that cyberspace consists of a physical and a syntactic (or logical) layer:  
The former includes the physical infrastructure through which the data travel wired or wireless, including 
servers, routers, satellites, cables, wires, and the computers, while the latter includes the protocols that 
allow data to be routed and understood, as well as the software used and the data.  David J. Betz & Tim 
Stevens, Analogical Reasoning and Cyber Security, 44 SECURITY DIALOGUE 147, 151 (2013).  Cyber 
operations can then be seen as “the reduction of information to electronic format and the actual 
movement of that information between physical elements of cyber infrastructure.”  NILS MELZER, 
UNIDIR RES., CYBERWARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2011), available at http://www.isn.et 
hz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/ Detail/?lng=en&id=134218.  In its 2013 Report, the Group of 
Governmental Experts established by the UN General Assembly confirmed that “State sovereignty and 
international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT-related 
activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory.”  Rep. of the Group of 
Gov. Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. and Telecomm. in the Context of Int’l Sec., 68th Sess., 8, U.N. 
Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013). 
 100.   Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, para. 57 (Mar. 31). 
 101.   Markoff, supra note 13. 
 102.   See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 103.   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 
I.C.J. 392, para. 101 (Nov. 26). 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Symposium Issue 2 
2015] EVIDENTIARY ISSUES RELATED TO CYBER OPERATIONS 247 
 
who bears the burden of proving it . . . .”104  In the El Salvador/Honduras case, the 
Court stated that it 
fully appreciates the difficulties experienced by El Salvador in collecting its 
evidence, caused by the interference with governmental action resulting 
from acts of violence.  It cannot however apply a presumption that 
evidence which is unavailable would, if produced, have supported a 
particular party’s case; still less a presumption of the existence of evidence 
which has not been produced.105 
The application of the onus probandi incumbit actori principle is also not 
affected by the possible asymmetry in the position of the litigants in discharging the 
burden of proof due to the fact that one has acted covertly (as is virtually always the 
case of cyber operations).106  As Judge Owada points out in his Separate Opinion 
attached to the Oil Platforms judgment, however, the Court should “take a more 
proactive stance on the issue of evidence and that of fact-finding” in such cases in 
order to ensure that the rules of evidence are applied in a “fair and equitable 
manner” to both parties.107 
Finally, it has been argued that a reversal of the burden of proof may derive 
from an application of the precautionary principle based on international 
environmental law in cyberspace.108  The precautionary principle entails “the duty to 
undertake all appropriate regulatory and other measures at an early stage, and well 
before the (concrete) risk of harm occurs.”109  On this view, States would have an 
obligation to implement measures to prevent the possible misuse of their cyber 
infrastructure, in particular by establishing a national cyber security framework.110  
Regardless of whether the precautionary principle, with its uncertain normativity, 
extends to cyberspace,111 it still would not lead to a reversal of the burden of proof 
from the claimant to the State from which a cyber operation originates.  In the Pulp 
Mills case, the ICJ concluded that “while a precautionary approach may be relevant 
in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute [of the River 
Uruguay], it does not follow that it operates as a reversal of the burden of proof.”112  
 
 104.   Id. 
 105.  Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), Judgment, 1992 
I.C.J. 351, para. 63 (Sept. 11). 
 106.   Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 306, para. 46 (Nov. 6); (separate opinion of 
Judge Owada). 
 107.   Id. para. 47. 
 108.   See Thilo Marauhn, Customary Rules of International Environmental Law – Can They Provide 
Guidance for Developing a Peacetime Regime for Cyberspace?, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE 
ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 34, at 475 (describing the precautionary approach’s relationship 
to international environmental law). 
 109.   Katharina Ziolkowski, General Principles of International Law as Applicable in Cyberspace, in 
PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 34, at 169. 
 110.   Id. 
 111.   See Marauhn, supra note 108, at 475–76 (asserting doubt that the precautionary principle applies 
to cyberspace). 
 112.   Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, para. 164 (Apr. 20). 
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The Court, however, did not specify whether the precautionary principle might result 
in at least a lowering of the standard of proof.113 
In light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that it is unlikely that the 
ICJ would accept that there is a reversal of the burden of proof in the cyber context.  
As has been correctly argued, “suggesting a reversal of the burden of proof could 
easily lead to wrong and even absurd results given the possibility of routing cyber 
operations through numerous countries, and to the denouncing of wholly uninvolved 
and innocent States.”114  In the case of the 2007 DDoS campaign against Estonia, for 
instance, the botnets included computers located not only in Russia, but also in the 
United States, Europe, Canada, Brazil, Vietnam and other countries.115  Difficulties 
in discharging the burden of proof, which are particularly significant in the context 
under examination, may, however, result in an alleviation of the standard of proof 
required to demonstrate a particular fact.  It is to this aspect that the analysis now 
turns. 
III. STANDARD OF PROOF AND CYBER OPERATIONS 
It is well known that, while in civil law systems there are no specific standards of 
proof that judges have to apply because they are authorized to evaluate the evidence 
produced according to their personal convictions on a case-by-case basis, common 
law jurisdictions employ a rigid classification of standards.116  From the most to the 
least stringent, these include:  beyond reasonable doubt (i.e., indisputable evidence, a 
standard used in criminal trials), clear and convincing (or compelling) evidence (i.e., 
more than probable but short of indisputable), and the preponderance of evidence or 
balance of probabilities (i.e., more likely than not or reasonably probable, a standard 
normally used in civil proceedings).117  A fourth standard is that of prima facie 
evidence—a standard that merely requires indicative proof of the correctness of the 
contention made.118 
The Statute of the ICJ and the Rules of Court neither require specific standards 
of proof nor indicate what methods of proof the Court will consider as being 
probative in order to meet a certain standard.119  The ICJ has to date avoided clearly 
indicating the standards of proof expected from the litigants during the 
proceedings.120  It has normally referred to the applicable standard of proof in the 
 
 113.   See id. (discussing the applicability of the precautionary principle to the burden of proof). 
 114.   Geiß & Lahmann, supra note 34, at 628. 
 115.   U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES, supra note 8, at 173. 
 116.   Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 553, 594 (2006). 
 117.   Mary Ellen O’Connell, Rules of Evidence for the Use of Force in International Law’s New Era, 
100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 44, 45 (2006) [hereinafter O’Connell, Rules of Evidence]; Milanović, supra 
note 116, at 594; Green, supra note 49, at 167. 
 118.   Green, supra note 49, at 166; Geiß & Lahmann, supra note 34, at 624. 
 119.   See generally Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933; Rules 
of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 6. 
 120.   That approach has been criticized by judges from common law countries.  See, e.g., Oil Platforms 
(Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 270, paras. 42–44 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal) (stating that 
the Court failed to explain a standard of proof); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 225, paras. 30–39 
(Nov. 6)(separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (criticizing the court for not stating a standard of proof). 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Symposium Issue 2 
2015] EVIDENTIARY ISSUES RELATED TO CYBER OPERATIONS 249 
 
judgments, but at that point it is of course too late for the parties to take it into 
account in pleading their cases.121 
There is no agreement on what standard of proof the ICJ should expect from 
the parties in the cases before it.122  If, because of their nature, international criminal 
courts use the beyond reasonable doubt standard in their proceedings,123 the most 
appropriate analogy for inter-state litigation is not with criminal trials, but with 
certain types of civil litigation.124  In his Dissenting Opinion in the Corfu Channel 
case, Judge Krylov suggested that “[o]ne cannot condemn a State on the basis of 
probabilities.  To establish international responsibility, one must have clear and 
indisputable facts.”125  Wolfrum has argued that, while the jurisdiction of an 
international court over a case should be established beyond reasonable doubt, the 
ICJ has generally applied a standard comparable to that of preponderance of 
evidence used in domestic civil proceedings when deciding disputes involving state 
responsibility.126  Others have maintained that such a standard only applies to cases 
not concerning attribution of international wrongful acts, such as border 
delimitations, and that when international responsibility is at stake, the standard is 
stricter and requires clear and convincing evidence.127 
It is therefore difficult, and perhaps undesirable,128 to identify a uniform 
standard of proof generally applicable in inter-state litigation or even a predominant 
one:  the Court “tends to look at issues as they arise.”129  This case-by-case approach, 
however, does not exclude that a standard of proof may be identified having regard 
to the primary rules in dispute, i.e., “the substantive rules of international law 
through . . . which the Court will reach its decision.”130  Indeed, when the allegation is 
the same, it seems logical that the evidentiary standard should also be the same.131  
There are indications, for instance, that claims related to jus ad bellum violations, in 
particular in relation to the invocation of an exception to the prohibition of the use of 
 
 121.   See Teitelbaum, supra note 65, at 124 (“The Court’s determination of the standard of proof may 
be said to be made on an ad hoc basis, and is only revealed at the end of the process when the Court 
delivers its judgment.”).  It has been suggested that “the Court might consider whether, either prior to the 
submission of written pleadings, after the first round of written pleadings, or prior to the oral hearings, it 
should ask the parties to meet a specific burden of proof for certain claims.”  Id. at 128). 
 122.   H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President, Int’l Court of Justice, Speech to the Sixth Committee of 
the General Assembly 4 (Nov. 2, 2007). 
 123.   Wolfrum, supra note 36, at 569. 
 124.   Waxman, supra note 57, at 59. 
 125.   Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 72 (Apr. 9) (dissenting opinion of Judge 
Krylov). 
 126.   Wolfrum, supra note 36, at 566. 
 127.   RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 53, at 133. 
 128.   Green, supra note 49, at 167. 
 129.   Sir Arthur Watts, Burden of Proof, and Evidence before the ECJ, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES:  ISSUES AND LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 289, 294 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000). 
 130.   ROSENNE, supra note 77, at 1043.  In Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 
Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 639, para. 54 (Nov. 30), the ICJ makes a similar point with regard to the burden of 
proof. 
 131.   See Green, supra note 49, at 169–71 (suggesting that one consistent standard should apply to all 
cases of self-defense—whatever magnitude the consequences of the violation of the prohibition of the use 
of force might have—both to the objective and subjective elements of the internationally wrongful act). 
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force in international relations, have been treated as requiring ‘“clear and convincing 
evidence.”132  In the Nicaragua judgment, the Court referred to “convincing 
evidence” of the facts on which a claim is based and to the lack of “clear evidence” of 
the degree of control exercised by the United States over the contras.133  In the Oil 
Platforms case, the ICJ rejected evidence with regard to Iran’s responsibility for mine 
laying that was “highly suggestive, but not conclusive,” holding that “evidence 
indicative of Iranian responsibility for the attack on the Sea Isle City” was 
insufficient.134  In Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ referred again to facts 
“convincingly established by the evidence,” “convincing evidence,” and “evidence 
weighty and convincing.”135  Beyond the ICJ, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission also found that there was “clear” evidence that events in the vicinity of 
Badme were minor incidents and did not reach the magnitude of an armed attack.136  
The above suggests that at least clear and convincing evidence is expected for claims 
related to the use of force.  As self-defense is an exception to the prohibition of the 
use of force, in particular, the standard of proof should be high enough to limit its 
invocation to exceptional circumstances and thus avoid abuses.137 
If clear and convincing evidence is required at least for claims related to the use 
of armed force, the question arises whether there is a special, and lower, standard in 
the cyber context, in particular for claims of self-defense against cyber operations.  
Indeed, “evidentiary thresholds that might have worked well in a world of 
conventional threats—where capabilities could be judged with high accuracy and the 
costs of false negatives to peace and security were not necessarily devastating—risk 
exposing States to unacceptable dangers.”138  There is of course no case law in 
relation to claims arising out of inter-state cyber operations,139 so possible indications 
in this sense have to be found elsewhere.  The Project Grey Goose Report on the 
2008 cyber operations against Georgia, for instance, relies on the concordance of 
various pieces of circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Russian government was 
 
 132.   O’Connell, Evidence of Terror, supra note 66, at 22; see also Teitelbaum, supra note 65, at 125–26 
(discussing an ICJ case in which the Court applied a standard “similar to” clear and convincing). 
 133.   Green, supra note 49, at 172; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 24, 29, 62, 109 (June 27) (mentioning both 
“convincing” and lack of “clear” evidence). 
 134.   Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, paras. 71, 61 (Nov. 6).  See also Green, 
supra note 49, at 172–73; Teitelbaum, supra note 65, at 125–26 (arguing that the ICJ uses a clear and 
convincing standard of evidence). 
 135.   Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 
I.C.J. 168, paras. 72, 91, 136 (Dec. 19).  Confusingly, however, in other parts of the Judgment the Court 
seemed to employ a prima facie or preponderance of evidence standard, in particular when it had to 
determine whether the conduct of armed groups against the DRC was attributable to Uganda.  Green, 
supra note 49, at 175–76. 
 136.   Partial Award—Jus Ad Bellum:  Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8 (Eth. v. Eri.), 26 R.I.A.A. 459, para. 12 
(Eri. Eth. Cl. Comm. 2005); See O’Connell, Rules of Evidence, supra note 117117, at 45 (discussing the 
evidence standard decided in the Ethiopia-Eritrea Jus Ad Bellum Claim). 
 137.   O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra note 64, at 898. 
 138.   Waxman, supra note 57, at 62.  The author argues that “the required degree of certainty about 
capability ought to vary with certainty about intent.”  Id. at 61.  Transposed in the cyber context, when the 
likelihood that an adversary will be able and willing to use cyber weapons is higher, less evidence will be 
required to prove it. 
 139.   Herbert Lin, Cyber Conflict and International Humanitarian Law, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 515, 
524 (2012). 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Symposium Issue 2 
2015] EVIDENTIARY ISSUES RELATED TO CYBER OPERATIONS 251 
 
responsible for the operations.140  In its reply to the U.N. Secretary-General on issues 
related to information security, the United States claimed that “high-confidence 
attribution of identity to perpetrators cannot be achieved in a timely manner, if ever, 
and success often depends on a high degree of transnational cooperation.”141  In a 
Senate questionnaire fulfilled in preparation for a hearing on his nomination to head 
of the U.S. Cyber Command, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander argued that 
“some level of mitigating action” can be taken against cyber attacks “even when we 
are not certain who is responsible.”142  Similar words were employed by his successor, 
Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers: “International law does not require that a nation 
know who is responsible for conducting an armed attack before using capabilities to 
defend themselves from that attack.”143  However, Vice Admiral Rogers also 
cautioned that, “from both an operational and policy perspective, it is difficult to 
develop an effective response without a degree of confidence in attribution.”144  
Overall, the above views seem to suggest an evidentiary standard, based on 
circumstantial evidence, significantly lower than clear and convincing evidence and 
even lower than a preponderance of the evidence, on the basis that identification and 
attribution are more problematic in a digital environment than in the analog world.145 
It is difficult, however, to see why the standard of proof should be lower simply 
because it is more difficult to reach it.  The standard of proof exists not to 
disadvantage the claimant, but to protect the respondent against false attribution, 
which, thanks to tricks like IP spoofing,146 onion routing,147 and the use of botnets,148 is 
a particularly serious risk in the cyber context.  The views mentioned above are also 
far from being unanimously held, even within the U.S. government:  The Air Force 
 
 140.   See generally PROJECT GREY GOOSE, RUSSIA/GEORGIA CYBER WAR—FINDINGS AND 
ANALYSIS (PHASE I REPORT) (2008), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/6967393/Project-Grey-
Goose-Phase-I-Report. 
 141.   Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications, supra note 3, at 17. 
 142.   Advance questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander for Commander, USA Nominee for 
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, S. Comm. Armed Servs. 12 (Apr. 15, 2010), 
https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Alexander_04-15-10.pdf. 
 143.   Advance Questions for Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN Nominee for Commander, U.S. 
Cyber Command, S. Comm. Armed Servs. (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/Rogers_03-11-14.pdf. 
 144.   Id. 
 145.   See, e.g., David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 
87, 93 (2010) (“Given the difficulties raised by the traditional requirement to attribute cyber attacks 
conclusively and directly to a state . . . there is now a growing effort to formulate acceptable alternatives to 
the notion of ‘conclusive attribution.’”).  The author seems, however, to confuse attribution criteria and 
standards of evidence. 
 146.   See Bradley Raboin, Corresponding Evolution:  International Law and the Emergence of Cyber 
Warfare, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 602, 614–15 (2011) (“IP spoofing is a kind of hijacking 
technique that allows the hacking user to operate a computer while appearing as a trusted host.  By thus 
concealing his true identity, the hacker can gain access to computer networks and network resources.”). 
 147.   See Christopher Riley, The Need for Software Innovation Policy, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. 589, 607 (2007) (“Onion routing protects the anonymity of an Internet user by routing messages through 
multiple intermediate nodes.  Each intermediate node hides the origin of messages in such a way that a 
reply message can reach the original source node, and yet no node knows more of the path of the message 
than the nodes immediately before and after it on the message path.”). 
 148.   See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1034 n.158 (2014) (“A 
botnet is a set of computers that have been infected with malware and that are controlled by someone 
other than their users.”). 
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Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations, for instance, States that attribution of cyber 
operations should be established with “sufficient confidence and verifiability.”149  A 
report prepared by Italy’s Parliamentary Committee on the Security of the Republic 
goes further and requires it to be demonstrated “in modo inequivocabile” 
(unequivocally) that an armed attack by cyber means originated from a State and 
was undertaken on the instruction of governmental bodies.150  The document also 
suggests that attribution to a State requires  “«prove» informatiche inconfutabili” 
(“irrefutable digital «evidence»”), which, the Report concedes, is a standard that is 
very difficult to meet.151  Germany also highlighted the danger of a lack of “reliable 
attribution” of malicious cyber activities in creating opportunities for “false flag 
attacks,” misunderstandings, and miscalculations.152  In relation to the DDoS attacks 
against Estonia, a U.K. House of Lords document lamented that “the analysis of 
today is really very elusive, not conclusive and it would still be very difficult to act on 
it.”153  Finally, the AIV/CAVV Report, which has been endorsed by the Dutch 
government,154 requires “reliable intelligence . . . before a military response can be 
made to a cyber attack” and “sufficient certainty regarding the identity of the author 
of the attack.”155  In its response to the Report, the Dutch government argued that 
self-defense can be exercised against cyber attacks “only if the origin of the attack 
and the identity of those responsible are sufficiently certain.”156 
All in all, clear and convincing evidence seems the appropriate standard not 
only for claims of self-defense against traditional armed attacks, but also for those 
against cyber operations:  a prima facie or preponderance of evidence standard might 
lead to specious claims and false or erroneous attribution, while a beyond reasonable 
doubt standard would be unrealistic.  In the Norwegian Loans case, Judge 
Lauterpacht emphasized that “the degree of burden of proof . . . adduced ought not 
to be so stringent as to render the proof unduly exacting.”157  As explained by 
 
 149.   U.S. AIR FORCE, CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS:  AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-12, at 10 
(2010). 
 150.   COMITATO PARLAMENTARE PER LA SICUREZZA DELLA REPUBBLICA, RELAZIONE SULLE 
POSSIBILI IMPLICAZIONI E MINACCE PER LA SICUREZZA NAZIONALE DERIVANTI DALL’UTILIZZO 
DELLO SPAZIO CIBERNETICO  26 (2010), available at http://www.parlamento.it/documenti/repository/com 
missioni/bicamerali/COMITATO%20SICUREZZA/Doc_XXXIV_n_4.pdf. 
 151.   Id. 
 152.   Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Fed. Republic of Ger. to the United Nations addressed 
to the Office for Disarmament Affairs, Note No. 516/2012 (Nov. 5, 2012).  Laurie R. Blank, International 
Law and Cyber Threats from Non-State Actors, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 406, 417 (2013) (“[T]he victim State 
must tread carefully and seek as much clarity regarding the source of the attack as possible to avoid 
launching a self-defense response in the wrong direction.”). 
 153.   EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, PROTECTING EUROPE AGAINST LARGE-SCALE CYBER-
ATTACKS, 2009–2010, H.L. 68, at 42 (emphasis added). 
 154.   Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare:  Quo Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 280 
n.40 (2014);  Government Response to the AIP/CAVV Report on Cyber Warfare, RIJKSOVERHEID 
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2012/04/26 
/cavv-advies-nr-22-bijlageregeringsreactie-en/cavv-advies-22-bijlage-regeringsreactie-en.pdf (Netherlands) 
[hereinafter GOV’T OF THE NETH.]. 
 155.   ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT’L AFFAIRS & ADVISORY COMM. ON ISSUES OF PUB. INT’L LAW, 
CYBER WARFARE 22 (2011). 
 156.   GOV’T OF THE NETH., supra note 154, at 5.  The CCD COE Report on Georgia also concludes 
that “there is no conclusive proof of who is behind the DDoS attacks, even though finger pointing at 
Russia is prevalent by the media.”  TIKK ET AL., supra note 14, at 12 (emphasis added). 
 157.   Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9, 39 (July 6) (separate opinion of 
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Michael Schmitt, a clear and convincing standard “obliges a state to act reasonably, 
that is, in a fashion consistent with the normal state practice in same or similar 
circumstances.  Reasonable States neither respond precipitously on the basis of 
sketchy indications of who has attacked them nor sit back passively until they have 
gathered unassailable evidence.”158 
Those who criticize a clear and convincing evidence standard for the exercise of 
self-defense against cyber operations would rely on the fact that, due to the speed at 
which such operations may occur and produce their consequences, the requirement 
of a high level of evidence may in fact render it impossible for the victim State safely 
to exercise its right of self-defense.  Such concerns, however, are exaggerated.  
Indeed, if the cyber attack was a standalone event that instantaneously produced its 
damaging effects, a reaction in self-defense would not be necessary.  If, on the other 
hand, the cyber attack were continuing or formed of a series of smaller scale cyber 
attacks,159 the likelihood that clear and convincing evidence could be collected would 
considerably increase.160 
However, there are also indications that the most serious allegations, such as 
those involving international crimes, require a higher standard to discharge the 
burden of proof.161  As Judge Higgins wrote in her separate opinion attached to the 
Oil Platforms Judgment, “the graver the charge the more confidence must there be 
in the evidence relied on . . . .”162  In Corfu Channel, the Court appeared to suggest 
that the standard of proof is higher for charges of “exceptional gravity against a 
State.”163  In the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ confirmed that “claims against a 
State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is 
fully conclusive . . . .  The same standard applies to the proof of attribution for such 
acts” (and accordingly applies both to the objective and subjective elements of an 
international crime) (emphasis added).164  The Court also found that assistance 
 
Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht). 
 158.   Schmitt’s exact verbiage calls for a “clear and compelling” standard.  Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber 
Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV 569, 595 (2011). 
 159.   On the application of the doctrine of accumulation of events to cyber operations, see ROSCINI, 
supra note 1, at 108–10. 
 160.   See Yoram Dinstein, Professor Emeritus, Tel Aviv University, Cyber War and International Law, 
Concluding Remarks at the 2012 Naval War College International Law Conference, in 89 INT’L L. STUD. 
276, 282 (2013) (exemplifying similar reasoning in relation to the identification of the State responsible for 
the cyber attack). 
 161.   Contra Prisoners of War–Eritrea’s Claim 17 (Eth. v. Eri.), Partial Award, 26 R.I.A.A. 23, paras. 
45–47 (Eri. Eth. Cl. Comm. 2003) (deciding to require clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to a 
higher burden of proof, because the Commission is “not a criminal tribunal”). 
 162.   Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 225, para. 33 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of 
Judge Higgins). 
 163.   Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 17 (Apr. 9).  This interpretation of the 
Court’s judgment, however, is not uncontroversial.  See Andrea Gattini, Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ’s 
Genocide Judgment, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 889, 896 (2007) (“The Court somehow hid behind a quotation 
from the Corfu Channel case, where it had been stated that ‘a charge of such exceptional gravity against a 
State would require a degree of certainty that has not been reached here.’”). 
 164.   Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, para. 209 (Feb. 26) (emphasis added); 
see also U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. at 17.  It is not entirely clear whether the Court linked the notion of 
gravity to the importance of the norm allegedly breached or the magnitude of the violation.  It would seem 
more correct to refer to the gravity as linked to the former, as, if the evidentiary standard depended on the 
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provided by Yugoslavia to the Bosnian Serbs had not been “established beyond any 
doubt.”165  Gravity is, of course, inherent in any jus cogens violation.166  Claims of 
reparation for cyber operations qualifying as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or 
acts of genocide, therefore, should require fully conclusive evidence, not just 
evidence that is clear and convincing.  As has been aptly suggested, however, “[a] 
higher standard of proof may only be justified if the Court is willing to balance this 
strict approach with a more active use of its fact-finding powers to make sure that 
claims for breaches of jus cogens norms are not doomed to fail merely on evidential 
grounds.”167 
In the Bosnian Genocide judgment, the Court also appeared to make a 
distinction between a violation of the prohibition of committing acts of genocide, for 
which evidence must be “fully conclusive,” and a violation of the obligation to 
prevent acts of genocide, where the Court required “proof at a high level of certainty 
appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation,”168 even though not necessarily fully 
conclusive evidence.169  Such an approach appears justified by the different nature of 
the obligation breached:  Indeed, presumptions and inferences necessarily play a 
more significant role when the wrongful act to be proved consists of an omission, as 
is the case of the breach of an obligation to prevent.170  By the same token, it may be 
suggested that the standard of proof required to prove that a State has conducted 
cyber operations amounting to international crimes is higher than that required to 
prove that it did not exercise the necessary due diligence to stop its cyber 
infrastructure from being used by others to commit international crimes. 
IV. METHODS OF PROOF AND CYBER OPERATIONS 
What type of evidence may be relied on in order to meet the required standard 
of proof and establish that a cyber operation has occurred, has produced damage, 
and is attributable to a certain State or non-state actor?  The production of evidence 
before the ICJ is regulated by Articles 48 to 52 of its Statute and by the Rules of 
Court.  There is, however, no list of the methods of proof available to parties before 
the Court nor any indication of their different probative weight.171  Article 48 of the 
ICJ Statute provides only that “[t]he Court shall . . . make all arrangements 
 
latter, “some States could have a perverse incentive to sponsor more devastating attacks so as to raise the 
necessary burden of proof and potentially defeat accountability.”  Shackelford & Andres, supra note 34, at 
990. 
 165.   Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J.  para. 422. 
 166.   See Sévrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 
149, 172 (2011) (describing the Ferrini case, which illustrates the Court’s “reli[ance] on jus cogens not as a 
conflict rule, but rather as a means of highlighting the seriousness of the acts committed by the foreign 
State . . . .”). 
 167.   Benzing, supra note 56, at 1266. 
 168.   Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. paras. 209–10. 
 169.   Benzing, supra note 56, at 1266. 
 170.   Gattini, supra note 163, at 899.  In Nicaragua, the Court had already found that the fact that 
Nicaragua had to prove a negative (the non-supply of arms to rebels in neighboring countries) had to be 
borne in mind when assessing the evidence.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U. S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 147 (June 27). 
 171.   Compare Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 48–52, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933, 
and Rules of Court, arts. 57, 58, 62–64, 71, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 6 (together demonstrating that there 
are no methods of proof for dealing with the production of evidence before the ICJ). 
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connected with the taking of evidence,”172 while Article 58 of the Rules of Court 
confirms that “the method of handling the evidence and of examining any witnesses 
and experts . . . shall be settled by the Court after the views of the parties have been 
ascertained in accordance with Article 31 of these Rules.”173 
As a leading commentator has observed, “[t]he International Court of Justice 
has construed the absence of restrictive rules in its Statute to mean that a party may 
generally produce any evidence as a matter of right, so long as it is produced within 
the time limits fixed by the Court.”174  Although it is primarily the parties’ 
responsibility to produce the evidence necessary to prove the facts alleged, the Court 
may also order the production of documents, call experts and witnesses, conduct site 
visits, and request relevant information from international organizations.175  In 
Nicaragua, for instance, the Court found that it was “not bound to confine its 
consideration to the material formally submitted to it by the parties.”176  In that 
judgment, the ICJ also emphasized the principle of free assessment of evidence, 
stating that “within the limits of its Statute and Rules, [the Court] has freedom in 
estimating the value of the various elements of evidence . . . .”177 
In the next pages, methods of proof that may be relevant in relation to cyber 
operations will be examined. 
A. Documentary Evidence 
Although there is no formal hierarchy between different sources, the ICJ has 
taken a civil law court approach and has normally given primacy to written 
documents over oral evidence.178  Documentary evidence includes “all information 
submitted by the parties in support of the contentions contained in the pleadings 
other than expert and witness testimony.”179  According to Shabtai Rosenne, 
documentary evidence can be classified in four categories: 
published treaties included in one of the recognized international or 
national collections of treaty texts; official records of international 
organizations and of national parliaments; published and unpublished 
diplomatic correspondence, and communiqués and other miscellaneous 
materials, including books, maps, plans, charts, accounts, archival material, 
 
 172.   Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 48, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933. 
 173.   Rules of the Court, art. 58, 2007 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 91. 
 174.   DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 184 (rev. ed. 1975). 
 175.   Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 49, 50, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933; Rules of 
Court, arts. 62, 66, 67, 69, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 6. 
 176.   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, para. 30 (June 27).  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 49, June 26, 1945, 33 
U.N.T.S. 933; Rules of the Court, art. 62, 2007 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 91. 
 177.   Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. para. 60.  See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, para. 59 (Dec. 19) (explaining the Court’s own 
considerations regarding the weight of the evidence). 
 178.   RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 53, at 232; Aguilar Mawdsley, supra note 79, at 543. 
 179.   Wolfrum, supra note 36, at 558. 
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photographs, films, legal opinions and opinions of experts, etc.; and 
affidavits and declarations.180 
Although the Court has the power to call upon the parties to produce any 
evidence it deems necessary or to seek such evidence itself, it has normally refrained 
from doing so and has relied on that spontaneously produced by the litigants.181  All 
documents not “readily available” must be produced by the interested party.182  A 
“publication readily available” is a document “available in the public domain . . . in 
any format (printed or electronic), form (physical or on-line, such as posted on the 
internet) or on any data medium (on paper, on digital or any other media) . . . [that] 
should be accessible in either of the official languages of the Court,” and which it is 
possible to consult “within a reasonably short period of time.”183  The accessibility 
should be assessed in relation to the Court and the other litigant.184  The fact that a 
publication is “readily available” does not necessarily render the concerned facts 
public knowledge, but rather relieves the party from the burden of having to produce 
it.185  The facts, however, still need to be proved.186 
Official state documents, such as national legislation, cyber doctrines, manuals, 
strategies, directives and rules of engagement, may become relevant in establishing 
state responsibility for cyber operations.187  In Nicaragua, for instance, the 
responsibility of the United States for encouraging violations of international 
humanitarian law was established on the basis of the publication of a manual on 
psychological operations.188  According to the Court, “[t]he publication and 
dissemination of a manual in fact containing the advice quoted above must . . . be 
regarded as an encouragement, which was likely to be effective, to commit acts 
 
 180.   ROSENNE, supra note 77, at 1246 (footnotes omitted).  In the Bosnian Genocide Judgment, the 
Court noted that the parties had produced 
reports, resolutions and findings by various United Nations organs, including the Secretary-
General, the General Assembly, the Security Council and its Commission of Experts, and the 
Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities and the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the former 
Yugoslavia; documents from other inter-governmental organizations such as the Conference 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe; documents, evidence and decisions from the ICTY; 
publications from governments; documents from non-governmental organizations; media 
reports, articles and books. 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, para. 211 (Feb. 26); see also Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. para. 60. 
 181.   Practice Directions of the International Court of Justice, Practice Direction IX bis, paras. (2)(i)–
(ii), 2007 Acts & Docs. 163. 
 182.   Id. 
 183.   Id. 
 184.   Id. 
 185.   Rules of Court, art. 56(4), 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 6.  Benzing, supra note 56, at 1241. 
 186.   Benzing, supra note 56, at 1241. 
 187.   See Mark D. Young, National Cyber Doctrine:  The Missing Link in the Application of American 
Cyber Power, J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 173, 175–76 (2010) (arguing that a cyber security doctrine 
can answer questions concerning the roles and responsibilities in cyber operations and events such as 
cyber attacks). 
 188.   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, para. 113 (June 27). 
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contrary to general principles of international humanitarian law reflected in 
treaties.”189  Not all state documents, however, have the same probative value:  in 
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, the Court dismissed the relevance of 
certain internal military intelligence documents because they were unsigned, 
unauthenticated, or lacked explanation of how the information was obtained.190 
Military cyber documents are frequently classified in whole or in part for 
national security reasons.191  According to the doctrine of privilege in domestic legal 
systems, litigants may refuse to submit certain evidence to a court on confidentiality 
grounds.  No such doctrine exists before the ICJ.192  One could actually argue that 
there is an obligation on the litigants to cooperate in good faith with the Court in the 
proceedings before it, and therefore to produce all requested documents.193  There is, 
however, no sanction for failure to do so:  Article 49 of the ICJ Statute limits itself to 
providing that “[t]he Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents 
to produce any document or to supply any explanations.  Formal note shall be taken 
of any refusal.”194  While the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has found that “to grant States a blanket right to withhold, for 
security purposes, documents necessary for trial might jeopardise the very function 
of the International Tribunal, and ‘defeat its essential object and purpose’.”195  The 
ICJ has been reluctant to draw inferences from the refusal of a party to produce 
confidential documents.196  The problem has arisen twice before the Court:  in the 
Corfu Channel and in the Bosnian Genocide cases.  In the former, the ICJ called the 
United Kingdom, pursuant to Article 49 of the Statute, to produce an admiralty 
order.197  The United Kingdom refused to produce the document on grounds of naval 
secrecy,198 and witnesses also refused to answer questions in relation to the 
document.199  The ICJ decided not to “draw from this refusal to produce the orders 
any conclusions differing from those to which the actual events gave rise.”200  In the 
 
 189.   Id. para. 256. 
 190.   Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 
I.C.J. 168, paras. 125, 127–28, 133–34, 137 (Dec. 19). 
 191.   See Sean Lyngaas, New Cyber Doctrine Shows More Offense, Transparency, FCW (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://fcw.com/articles/2014/10/24/cyber-offense.aspx (discussing the “past military practice of over-
classifying discussions of strategy”). 
 192.   One of the problems with applying the doctrine of privilege in inter-state litigation is that 
international courts are unlikely to be able to verify whether state security interests are genuinely 
jeopardized by the document disclosure.  RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 54, at 208. 
 193.   It has been observed that “when a State becomes a party to the Statute of the ICJ, it necessarily 
accepts the obligation to produce before the Court all evidence available to it in any case it contests.”  Id. 
at 49. 
 194.   Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 49, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 (emphasis 
added). 
 195.   Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of 
Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, para. 65 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997). 
 196.   E.g., Anthony Carty, The Corfu Channel Case–And the Missing Admiralty Orders, 3 L. & PRAC. 
INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 1, 1 (2004) (detailing an instance in which the ICJ did not draw inferences from 
the failure of the Royal Navy to turn over confidential documents). 
 197.   Id. 
 198.   Id. 
 199.   Benzing, supra note 56, at 1243. 
 200.   Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Apr. 9). 
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Bosnian Genocide case, even though Bosnia and Herzegovina had called upon the 
Court to request Serbia and Montenegro to produce certain documents classified as 
military secrets, the Court decided not to proceed with the request, although it 
reserved the right subsequently to request the documents motu proprio.201  In its 
judgment, the ICJ limited itself to noting “the Applicant’s suggestion that the Court 
may be free to draw its own conclusions” from the fact that Serbia and Montenegro 
had not produced the document voluntarily.202  However, it does not seem that the 
Court ultimately drew any inferences from Serbia’s non-disclosure of the classified 
documents.203  It should be noted that, in both of the above-mentioned cases, 
alternative evidence was available to the Court.204  It has been suggested that “it 
remains a matter of conjecture how the ICJ might respond in cases where a 
confidential communication is the only possible evidence to determine the veracity of 
a factual assertion, and no alternative materials are available.”205  A possible solution 
is that any classified information be produced in closed sittings of the court.206 
Documents of international organizations may also be presented as evidence.207  
Overall, the Court has given particular credit to U.N. reports, Security Council 
resolutions, and other official U.N. documents.208  In Bosnian Genocide, the ICJ 
stated that the probative value of reports from official or independent bodies 
“depends, among other things, on (1) the source of the item of evidence (for 
instance, partisan or neutral), (2) the process by which it has been generated (for 
instance an anonymous press report or the product of a careful court or court-like 
process), and (3) the quality of the character of the item (such as statements against 
interest, and agreed or uncontested facts).”209  Several documents of international 
organizations address cyber issues.210  In particular, information security has been on 
the U.N. agenda since 1998, when the Russian Federation introduced a draft 
resolution in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly.211  Since then, the 
General Assembly has adopted a series of annual resolutions on the topic.212  The 
resolutions have called for the views of the U.N. Member States on information 
security and established three Groups of Governmental Experts that have examined 
threats in cyberspace and discussed “cooperative measures to address them.”213  
 
 201.   Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, para. 44 (Feb. 26). 
 202.   Id. para. 206. 
 203.   RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 53, at 214. 
 204.   See generally Carty, supra note 196; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. 43. 
 205.   RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 53, at 217. 
 206.   Id. at 218; Benzing, supra note 56, at 1243. 
 207.   See RIDDELL & PLANT, supra note 53, at  85–87. 
 208.   Teitelbaum, supra note 65, at 146. 
 209.   Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. para. 227.  In the case of the “Fall of 
Srebrenica” Report of the Secretary-General, the Court concluded that “the care taken in preparing the 
report, its comprehensive sources and the independence of those responsible for its preparation all lend 
considerable authority to it.”  Id. para. 229–30. 
 210.   E.g., G.A. Res. 66/24, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/24 (Dec 13, 2011) (expressing concern over 
“international information security”). 
 211.   Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/information 
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 212.   Id. 
 213.   Id. 
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While the first Group, established in 2004, did not produce a substantive report,214 the 
second, created in 2009, issued a report in 2010,215 and the third Group, which met 
between 2012 and 2013, also adopted a final report containing a set of 
recommendations.216  In addition, the views of U.N. Member States on information 
security are contained in the annual reports of the U.N. Secretary-General on 
developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of 
international security.217 
The Court has also relied on fact-finding from commissions and other courts.218  
In Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, the Court considered the Report of the Porter 
Commission, observing that neither party had challenged its credibility.219  
Furthermore, the Court accepted that “evidence [included in the Report] obtained 
by examination of persons directly involved, and who were subsequently cross-
examined by judges skilled in examination and experienced in assessing large 
amounts of factual information, some of it of a technical nature, merits special 
attention.”220  For these reasons, facts alleged by the parties that found confirmation 
in the Report were considered clearly and convincingly proved.221  There are, 
however, no examples of reports by judicial commissions in relation to cyber 
operations.222  One can at best recall the 2009 Report of the Independent Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia established by the Council of the 
European Union,223 which briefly addressed the cyber operations against Georgia.224  
The Report, however, is not of great probative weight, as it did not reach any 
conclusion on those operations’ attribution or legality, simply noting that “[i]f these 
attacks were directed by a government or governments, it is likely that this form of 
warfare was used for the first time in an inter-state armed conflict.”225  Even if not of 
 
 214.   U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, Fact Sheet:  Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ 
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 218.   Teitelbaum, supra note 65, at 152. 
 219.   Id.; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 
168, para. 60 (Dec. 19). 
 220.   Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. para. 61. 
 221.   See Teitelbaum, supra note 65, at 153 (“It appears that when a fact alleged by one of the parties 
was confirmed by one of the findings of the Porter Commission, the Court accepted the evidence has 
having met a clear and convincing standard of proof.”). 
 222.   See generally Major Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations:  Development and Use under 
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 121–73 (2009) (providing a holistic review of international cyber 
operations with no reference to judicial commission reports). 
 223.   INDEP. INT’L FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEOR., REPORT 2 (2009), 
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use to establish attribution, however, the Report could be relied on to establish that 
the cyber operations against Georgia did in fact occur.226 
Documents produced by NGOs and think tanks may also play an evidentiary 
role, albeit a limited one.  In relation to cyber operations, the CCD COE has 
prepared reports containing technical and legal discussion of the Estonia, Georgia 
and Iran cases, as well as of other cyber incidents.227  Project Grey Goose produced 
an open source investigation into cyber conflicts, including the 2008 cyber attacks on 
Georgia.228  In that case, the Report concluded “with high confidence that the 
Russian government will likely continue its practice of distancing itself from the 
Russian nationalistic hacker community thus gaining deniability while passively 
supporting and enjoying the strategic benefits of their actions.”229  Information 
security companies like Symantec, McAfee, and Mandiant also regularly compile 
detailed technical reports on cyber threats and specific incidents.230  In general, 
however, reports from NGOs and other non-governmental bodies have been 
considered by the ICJ as having less probative value than publications of States and 
international organizations and have been used in a corroborative role only.231  In 
Democratic Republic of the  Congo v. Uganda, for instance, the ICJ considered a 
report by International Crisis Group not to constitute “reliable evidence.”232  
Similarly, in Oil Platforms the Court did not find publications such as Lloyd’s 
Maritime Information Service, the General Council of British Shipping or Jane’s 
Intelligence Review to be authoritative public sources, as it had no “indication of 
what was the original source, or sources, or evidence on which the public sources 
relied.”233  This “unequal treatment” of documents of international organizations and 
NGOs has been criticized:  “the correct approach is for the Court to apply its general 
evaluative criteria to documents produced by NGOs just as it does to those 
generated by UN actors.”234 
As far as press reports and media evidence are concerned, one may recall, in the 
cyber context, the above-mentioned New York Times articles attributing Stuxnet to 
the United States and Israel.235  The ICJ, however, has been very reluctant to accept 
press reports as evidence and has treated them “with great caution.”236  Press reports 
that rely only on one source, rely on an interested source, or give no account of their 
 
 226.   See id. at 217–19 (detailing the occurrences that point to a clear indication that cyber attacks took 
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 230.   See, e.g., MANDIANT, APT1, supra note 30, at 1–74 (compiling one such report about China’s 
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sources have therefore been treated as having no probative value.237  In the Bosnian 
Genocide case, the Court dismissed an article in Le Monde, qualifying it as “only a 
secondary source.”238  In Nicaragua, the Court held that, even when they meet “high 
standards of objectivity,” it would regard the reports in press articles and extracts 
from books presented by the parties “not as evidence capable of proving facts, but as 
material which can nevertheless contribute, in some circumstances, to corroborating 
the existence of a fact, i.e., as illustrative material additional to other sources of 
evidence.”239  This was dependent on the sources being “wholly consistent and 
concordant as to the main facts and circumstances of the case.”240  It has been 
suggested that this expression means that “the press reports in question would have 
to confirm the facts as alleged by both of the parties, or confirm facts that have not 
been denied or contested by the parties.”241 
Apart from this, press reports may contribute, together with other sources, to 
demonstrate public knowledge of facts of which the Court may take judicial notice, 
thus relieving a party from having to discharge the burden of proof with regard to 
those facts.242  The fact that cyber incidents like Stuxnet have received extensive 
media coverage—and that the New York Times article has been followed by many 
others, including in The Washington Post243—would not, however, as such increase 
their probative weight or mean that the covered facts are of public knowledge.244  As 
already mentioned, in Nicaragua the ICJ noted that “[w]idespread reports of a fact 
may prove on closer examination to derive from a single source, and such reports, 
however numerous, will in such case have no greater value as evidence than the 
original source.”245 
B. Official Statements 
Statements made by official authorities outside the context of the judicial 
proceedings may play an important evidentiary role.  In the Tehran Hostages case, 
for instance, the ICJ recalled that it had “a massive body of information from various 
sources concerning the facts and circumstances of the present case, including 
numerous official statements of both Iranian and United States authorities.”246  
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Statements “emanating from high-ranking official political figures, sometimes indeed 
of the highest rank, are of particular probative value when they acknowledge facts or 
conduct unfavourable to the State represented by the person who made them.”247  
However, all depends on how those statements were made public:  “evidently, [the 
Court] cannot treat them as having the same value irrespective of whether the text is 
to be found in an official national or international publication, or in a book or 
newspaper.”248  In other words, statements that can be directly attributed to a state 
are of more probative value. 
The U.S. Department of Defense’s Assessment of International Legal Issues in 
Information Operations confirms that “[s]tate sponsorship might be persuasively 
established by such factors as . . . public statements by officials.”249  There does not 
seem to be, however, any official statement by Russian or Chinese authorities 
directly or even indirectly acknowledging responsibility for the cyber operations 
against Estonia, Georgia, and the United States; on the contrary, involvement was 
denied.250  With regard to Stuxnet, U.S. and Israeli authorities neither admitted nor 
denied attribution when asked questions about the incident.251  Whether this allows 
inferences to be drawn is discussed below.252 
C. Witness Testimony 
Witnesses may be called to provide direct oral evidence by the Court and by the 
litigants:  The latter case is conditioned upon the absence of objections by the other 
litigant or the recognition by the Court that the evidence is likely to be relevant.253  
The Court may also put questions to the witnesses and experts called by the parties.254  
The ICJ has not made extensive use of oral evidence.255  In Corfu Channel, for 
instance, naval officers were called to testify by the United Kingdom about the 
damage suffered by the Royal Navy ships and the nature and origin of the mines.256  
Albania also called witnesses to testify to the absence of mines in the Channel.257  
Nicaragua called five witnesses to testify in the Nicaragua case.258  In the same case, 
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the Court noted that “testimony of matters not within the direct knowledge of the 
witness, but known to him only from hearsay” is not “of much weight.”259 
It is worth recalling that the Court has also accepted witness evidence given in 
written form and attached to the written pleadings, but it has treated it “with 
caution”260 and has generally considered it of a probative value inferior to that of 
direct oral witness testimony.261  Factors to be considered in assessing the probative 
weight of affidavits include time, purpose and context of production, whether they 
were made by disinterested witnesses, and whether they attest to the existence of 
facts or only refer to an opinion with regard to certain events.262 
D. Enquiry and Experts 
According to Article 50 of the ICJ Statute, “[t]he Court may, at any time, 
entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may 
select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion.”263  
Enquiries have never been commissioned by the Court, which has rather relied on 
fact-finding reports from other sources.264  Experts may be necessary in cases of a 
highly technical nature or that involve expertise not possessed by the judges.265  It is 
likely, therefore, that the Court will appoint experts in cases involving cyber 
technologies.  The Court, however, would not be bound by their report. 
The parties may also call experts.266  As to the form of their participation in the 
oral proceedings, in Pulp Mills the ICJ reminded the parties that: 
[T]hose persons who provide evidence before the Court based on their 
scientific or technical knowledge and on their personal experience should 
testify before the Court as experts, witnesses or in some cases in both 
capacities, rather than counsel, so that they may be submitted to 
questioning by the other party as well as by the Court.267 
In the Whaling in the Antarctic case, therefore, the experts called by both Australia 
and Japan gave evidence as expert witnesses and were cross-examined,268 and the 
Court relied heavily on their statements to conclude that the special permits granted 
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by Japan for the killing, taking, and treatment of whales had not been granted “for 
purposes of scientific research.”269 
E. Digital Evidence 
Digital forensics “deals with identifying, storing, analyzing, and reporting 
computer finds, in order to present valid digital evidence that can be submitted in 
civil or criminal proceedings.”270  It includes the seizure, forensic imaging, and 
analysis of digital media, and the production of a report on the evidence so 
collected.271  It seems that most countries “do not make a legal distinction between 
electronic evidence and physical evidence.  While approaches vary, many countries 
consider this good practice, as it ensures fair admissibility alongside all other types of 
evidence.”272  Of course, not only do data have to be collected, but they also need to 
be interpreted, and the parties may disagree on their interpretation. 
For several reasons, however, digital evidence on its own is unlikely to play a 
decisive role in establishing state responsibility for cyber operations.  First, digital 
evidence is “volatile, has a short life span, and is frequently located in foreign 
countries.”273  Second, the collection of digital evidence can be very time consuming 
and requires the cooperation of the relevant internet service providers, which may be 
difficult to obtain when the attack originates from other States.274  Third, although 
digital evidence may lead to the identification of the computer or computer system 
from which the cyber operation originates, it does not necessarily identify the 
individual(s) responsible for the cyber operation (as the computer may have been 
hijacked, or the IP spoofed).275  In any case, such digital evidence will say nothing 
about whether the conduct of those individuals can be attributed to a State under the 
law of state responsibility.276 
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 273.   Fred Schreier, On Cyberwarfare 65 (DCAF Horizon 2015, Working Paper No. 7, 2012). 
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 275.   Id. at 65. 
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V. PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES IN THE CYBER CONTEXT 
As Judge ad hoc Franck emphasized in Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and 
Pulau Sipadan, “[p]resumptions are necessary and well-established aspects both of 
common and civil law and cannot but be a part of the fabric of public international 
law.”277  Previously, in his dissenting opinion in Corfu Channel, Judge Azevedo had 
argued that “[i]t would be going too far for an international court to insist on direct 
and visual evidence and to refuse to admit, after reflection, a reasonable amount of 
human presumptions with a view to reaching that state of moral, human certainty 
with which, despite the risk of occasional errors, a court of justice must be content.”278 
Although the difference is often blurred in inter-state litigation, presumptions 
may be prescribed by law (legal presumptions, or presumptions of law), or be 
reasoning tools used by the judges (presumptions of fact, or inferences).279  In other 
words, “[p]resumptions of law derive their force from law, while presumptions of fact 
derive their force from logic.”280  In international law, presumptions of law can derive 
from treaties, international customs, and general principles of law.281  According to 
Judge Owada in his dissenting opinion in the Whaling in the Antarctic case, for 
instance, good faith on the part of a contracting State in performing its obligations 
under a treaty “has necessarily to be presumed,”282 although the presumption is 
subject to rebuttal.283 
Inferences, or presumptions of fact, are closely linked to circumstantial 
evidence.284  In the Corfu Channel case, Judge Padawi Pasha defined circumstantial 
evidence as “facts which, while not supplying immediate proof of the charge, yet 
make the charge problable [sic] with the assistance of reasoning.”285  Inferences 
“convincingly” establishing state sponsorship for cyber operations are suggested in 
the U.S. Department of Defense’s Assessment of International Legal Issues in 
Information Operations, including “the state of relationships between the two 
countries, the prior involvement of the suspect State in computer network attacks, 
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the nature of the systems attacked, the nature and sophistication of the methods and 
equipment used, the effects of past attacks, and the damage which seems likely from 
future attacks.”286  In its reply to the U.N. Secretary-General on issues related to 
information security, the United States also claimed that “the identity and 
motivation of the perpetrator(s) can only be inferred from the target, effects and 
other circumstantial evidence surrounding an incident.”287  The commentary to Rule 
11 of the Tallinn Manual refers to inferences from “the prevailing political 
environment, whether the . . . operation portends the future use of military force, the 
identity of the attacker, any record of cyber operations by the attacker, and the 
nature of the target (such as critical infrastructure),” in order to determine whether a 
cyber operation qualifies as a use of force under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.288 
The ICJ, however, “has demonstrated an increasing resistance to the drawing of 
inferences from secondary evidence.”289  Only inferences to protect state sovereignty 
are normally drawn by the Court, while others are treated with great caution.290  The 
ICJ has drawn inferences in situations such as exclusive control of territory and non-
production of documents.291  As to the first, it has been argued that the State from 
which the cyber operation originates has presumptive knowledge of such operation.  
U.S. officials have claimed, for instance, that, with the control that the Iranian 
government exercises over the internet, it is “hard to imagine” that cyber attacks 
originating from Iran against U.S. oil, gas, and electricity companies could be 
conducted without governmental knowledge, even in the absence of direct proof of 
state involvement.292  The same considerations may be extended to cyber operations 
originating from China and other States where access to the Internet is under strict 
governmental control.  The U.S. Department of Defense’s Assessment of 
International Legal Issues in Information Operations also claims that “[s]tate 
sponsorship might be persuasively established by such factors as . . . the location of 
the offending computer within a state-controlled facility.”293  In literature, Richard 
Garnett and Paul Clarke have claimed that “in a situation where there have been 
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repeated instances of hostile computer activity emanating from a State’s territory 
directed against another State, it seems reasonable to presume that the host State 
had knowledge of such attacks and so should incur responsibility.”294  At least some 
cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia originated from Russian IP addresses, 
including those of state institutions.295  The Mandiant Report also traced the cyber 
intrusions into U.S. computers back to Chinese IP addresses.296  As has been seen, 
however, in the Corfu Channel case the ICJ held that “it cannot be concluded from 
the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory . . . that that State 
necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated 
therein . . . .”297  Only if there are other indications of state involvement may 
territorial control contribute to establish knowledge.298  In Oil Platforms, the ICJ also 
refused to accept the US argument that the territorial control exercised by Iran over 
the area from which the missile against the Sea Isle City had been fired was sufficient 
to demonstrate Iran’s responsibility.299  These conclusions are transposed in the cyber 
context by Rules 7 and 8 of the Tallinn Manual, according to which neither the fact 
that a cyber operation originates from a State’s governmental cyber infrastructure 
nor that it has been routed through the cyber infrastructure located in a State are 
sufficient evidence for attributing the operation to those States, although it may be 
“an indication that the State in question is associated with the operation.”300  The 
Tallinn Manual does not clarify what probative value this “indication” would have. 
If control of cyber infrastructure is not on its own sufficient to prove knowledge 
of the cyber operations originating therefrom, much less direct attribution, it may 
however have “a bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the 
knowledge of that State as to such events.”301  In particular, 
[b]y reason of this exclusive control [within its frontiers], the other State, 
the victim of a breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct 
proof of facts giving rise to responsibility.  Such a State should be allowed a 
more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.  This 
indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized 
by international decisions.302 
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According to the Court, then, inferences become particularly valuable, and 
assume a probative value higher than normal, when a litigant is unable to provide 
direct proof of facts because the evidence is under the exclusive territorial control of 
the other litigant.303  Such indirect evidence “must be regarded as of special weight 
when it is based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single 
conclusion.”304  The ICJ, therefore, coupled the exclusive territorial control by 
Albania with its silence about the mine laying and other circumstantial evidence, and 
concluded that Albania had knowledge of the mines.305  Transposed to the cyber 
context, the presence or origination of the hazard in the cyber infrastructure 
controlled by a State does not per se demonstrate knowledge by that State, but may 
contribute to such a finding if it is accompanied by other circumstantial evidence 
pointing in that direction.  In Corfu Channel, however, the Court specified that, when 
proof is based on inferences, these must “leave no room for reasonable doubt.”306  In 
the Bosnian Genocide case, the Court confirmed that in demonstrating genocidal 
intent “for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would 
have to be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent.”307  In any 
case, “no inference can be drawn which is inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly 
established by the evidence.”308 
Of course, the Court will first have to determine whether the party has 
“exclusive territorial control”309 of the cyber infrastructure from which the cyber 
operations originated (and, therefore, potentially of the evidence of who was 
responsible for them) before allowing the more liberal recourse to inferences.  This 
may cause particular difficulties in cases of armed conflict:  In the DRC v. Uganda 
case, for instance, one of the issues in dispute was whether Uganda had had control 
over Congolese territory.310  In the cyber context, determining whether a litigant has 
“territorial control” of the cyber infrastructure, and whether such control is 
“exclusive” may be equally difficult to establish and is linked to the ongoing debate 
on the States’ creeping jurisdiction over the Internet and cyberspace in general.311  In 
this context, it should be recalled that Rule 1 of the Tallinn Manual accepts that “[a] 
State may exercise control over cyber infrastructure and activities within its 
sovereign territory.”312 
It should also be noted that the ICJ has not always allowed the “more liberal 
recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence” in cases of exclusive 
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territorial control.313  In the Bosnian Genocide case, Bosnia and Herzegovina argued 
that, because of Serbia and Montenegro’s geographical situation, the standard of 
proof should be lower, and that the respondent “had a special duty of diligence in 
preventing genocide and the proof of its lack of diligence can be inferred from fact 
and circumstantial evidence.”314  The Court rejected this reasoning and established 
Serbia and Montenegro’s responsibility for failure to prevent genocide not on the 
basis of inferences but on documentary evidence and ICTY testimony.315 
Does refusal to disclose evidence allow negative inferences?  Article 38 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights provides 
that the facts alleged in the petition “shall be presumed to be true if the State has not 
provided responsive information during the period set by the Commission under the 
provisions of Article 37 of these Rules of Procedure, as long as other evidence does 
not lead to a different conclusion.”316  This is due to the different nature of human 
rights tribunals, where one of the parties is an individual and the other is a 
government, while disputes before the ICJ are between sovereign states.317  
According to Article 49 of its Statute, the ICJ may only take “[f]ormal note” of the 
refusal to disclose evidence:  This provision authorizes the Court to draw inferences 
but does not create a presumption of law.318  In any case, as has already been seen, in 
the Corfu Channel and the Bosnian Genocide cases the Court declined to draw any 
inferences from refusal to produce evidence, in the former case because there was a 
series of facts contrary to the inference sought.319  Of course, if the litigant decides not 
to produce certain evidence, it will bear the risk that the facts it claims will not be 
considered sufficiently proved.320 
VI. INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
There are no express rules on the admissibility of evidence in the ICJ Statute.  
Therefore, “[t]he general practice of the Court has been to admit contested 
documents and testimony, subject to the reservation that the Court will itself be the 
judge of the weight to be accorded to it.”321  Evidence may, however, be declared 
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inadmissible because it has been produced too late or not in the prescribed form.322  
Another example of inadmissible evidence is provided by the decision of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Factory at Chorzów case, where the 
ICJ’s predecessor held that it “cannot take account of declarations, admissions or 
proposals which the Parties may have made in the course of direct negotiations 
[when] . . . the negotiations in question have not . . . led to an agreement between 
[the parties].”323  The underlying reason for the inadmissibility of such material is to 
facilitate the diplomatic settlement of international disputes through negotiations, so 
that the negotiating parties do not have to fear that what they say in the negotiating 
context may be used against them in subsequent judicial proceedings.324 
Is evidence obtained through a violation of international law also inadmissible?  
Traditional espionage and cyber exploitation, used in support of traceback technical 
tools, may be a helpful instrument to establish proof of state responsibility for cyber 
operations.325  India has noted that “[c]yber security intelligence forms an integral 
component of security of cyber space in order to be able to anticipate attacks, adopt 
suitable counter measures and attribute the attacks for possible counter action.”326  It 
is doubtful whether the above activities constitute internationally wrongful acts, 
although one commentator has argued, for instance, that cyber espionage may be a 
violation of the sovereignty of the targeted State whenever it entails an unauthorized 
intrusion into cyber infrastructure located in another State (be it governmental or 
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private).327  Data monitoring and interceptions may also be a violation of 
international human rights law.328 
Assuming, arguendo, that espionage and cyber exploitation are, at least in 
certain instances, internationally wrongful acts, what is the probative value of the 
evidence so collected?  There is no express rule in the Statute of the ICJ providing 
that evidence obtained through a violation of international law is inadmissible.329  It is 
also not a general principle of law, as it seems to be a rule essentially confined to the 
U.S. criminal system.330  As Thirlway argues, the rule in domestic legal systems is 
motivated by the need to protect the defendant against the wider powers of the 
prosecutor and its possible abuses:  In inter-state litigation, there is no criminal trial 
and no dominant party, as the litigants are States in a position of sovereign 
equality.331  In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ did not dismiss evidence illegally 
obtained by the United Kingdom in Operation Retail; on the contrary, it relied on it 
in order to determine the place of the accident and the nature of the mines.332  In fact, 
Albania never challenged the admissibility of the evidence acquired by the British 
Navy,333 and the Court did not address the question.334  What it found was not that the 
evidence had been illegally obtained, but that the purpose of gathering evidence did 
not exclude the illegality of certain conduct.335  In general, 
the approach of the Court is to discourage self-help in the getting of 
evidence involving internationally illicit acts, not by seeking to impose 
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any bar on the employment of evidence so collected, but by making it 
clear that such illicit activity is not necessary, since secondary evidence 
will be received and treated as convincing in appropriate circumstances.336 
In a cyber context, this means that while litigants are not entitled to access direct 
evidence that is located in another State’s computers or networks without 
authorization to submit it in the proceedings, that evidence’s existence allows the 
court to give more weight to circumstantial evidence.337 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following main conclusions can be drawn from the application to cyber 
operations of the ICJ’s rules and case law on evidence: 
-The burden of proof does not shift in the cyber context and continues to rest on 
the party that alleges a certain fact. 
-Whilst it is uncertain that a uniform standard of proof applicable to all cases 
involving international responsibility for cyber operations can be identified, it 
appears that claims of self-defense against cyber operations, like those against kinetic 
attacks, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence.  On the other hand, fully 
conclusive evidence is needed to prove that a litigant conducted cyber operations 
amounting to international crimes, and a slightly less demanding standard seems to 
apply when what needs to be proved is that the State did not exercise due diligence 
to stop its cyber infrastructure from being used by others to commit international 
crimes. 
-The Court may take ‘formal note’ of the refusal of a party to present classified 
cyber documents, but it has so far refrained from drawing negative inferences from 
the non-production of documents.  In any case, any such negative inferences could 
not contradict factual conclusions based on consistent evidence produced by the 
parties. 
-The Court gives more probative weight to official documents of States and 
international organizations such as the United Nations.  NGO reports and press 
articles on cyber incidents are only secondary sources of evidence that may be useful 
to corroborate other sources or to establish the public knowledge of certain facts, 
providing they are sufficiently rigorous and only when they are “wholly consistent 
and concordant as to the main facts and circumstances of the case.”338 
-The drawing of inferences is approached by the ICJ with great caution.  When 
there are objective difficulties for a litigant to discharge the burden of proof because 
the direct evidence lies within the exclusive territorial control of the other litigant, 
including its cyber infrastructure, a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact is 
admissible providing that they leave no room for reasonable doubt. 
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-Even if a litigant obtains evidence illegally, e.g., through an unauthorized 
intrusion into the computer systems of another State, the evidence so obtained may 
be taken into account by the Court, although the purpose of collecting evidence does 
not exclude the illegality of the conduct. 
